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I. Introduction
Copyright law in the United States grants visual artists1 the right to
control reproductions and adaptations of their original works2 as well as the
* Georgia Athletic Association, Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law,
Oberlin College, B.A., 1972, University of Chicago Law School, J.D., 1975
1. For purposes of this article, visual artists include painters, illustrators, sculptors, and
photographers. Office of the Register of Copyrights, Resale Royalties: An Updated Analysis 1
(December 2013) [hereinafter Register's Update].
2. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1) & (2).
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moral rights of attribution and integrity.3 It also gives artists the exclusive
right to control the first public distribution of their works.4 Copyright does
not, however, give visual artists the right to royalties on resales of their
works of art even if they retain their copyrights. Instead, it provides that
the owner of an acquired work of art "is entitled, without authority of the
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of that copy. ' ' 5  The
purchaser's right to resell the work of art is protected by copyright's first
6sale doctrine. Bills to amend the first sale doctrine to provide a resale
royalty for works of visual art, also called droit de suite, have been
proposed since the 1970s.7 This legislation would give artists a percentage
of the amount paid for one of their works each time that work is resold by
another party. It recognizes that the increase in the value of original art
works is due more to the artist's subsequent works and increased popularity
than to anything done by the initial buyer. 8 Resale royalties enable artists
to share in the long term financial success of their works.
9
Notwithstanding this rationale for enacting a resale royalty as well as
perceived disparities between copyright's treatment of visual artists
compared to other creators10 and endorsement of droit de suite by the
Register of Copyrights in 2013,11 federal proposals on resale royalty have
not reached a consensus. 12 However, the California legislature enacted its
own Resale Royalties Act (CRRA) in 1976. In simplified form, the Act
provides a five percent royalty to the artist for any original work that is sold
for $1,000 or more whenever the seller resides in California, or the sale
takes place in California, if the resale price exceeds the purchase price paid
by the seller. 13 Shortly after its passage, the CRRA was challenged as an
3. 17 U.S.C. § 106A. See generally David Shipley, The Empty Promise of VARA: The
Restrictive Application of a Narrow Statute, 83 MiSS. L.J. 985 (2014) [hereinafter The Empty
Promise].
4. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
5. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
6. Quality King Distribs Inc. v. L'Anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 141 - 142
(1998); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 349 - 50 (1908).
7. Droit de Suite: The Artist's Resale Royalty, December 1992, A Report of the Register
of Copyrights, at 86 [hereinafter Register's 1992 Report]; Register's Update, supra note 1, at 6 -
9.
8. Register's Update, supra note 1, at 11 - 12.
9. Id. at1.
10. See infra notes 25 to 32.
11. Register's Update, supra note 1, at 65 - 66.
12. Id. at 9-12; Register's 1992 Report, supra note 7, at 86.
13. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 986(a) & (b); see G.L. Francione, The California Art Preservation
Act and Federal Preemption by the 1976 Act - Equivalence and Actual Conflict, 31 ASCAP
COPYRIGHT LAW SYMP. 105, 106 - 10 (1984) (noting that California's law is broader than its
European counterparts) [hereinafter G.L. Francione]. Until 2015 the CRRA mandated a royalty if
the seller resided in California, regardless of where the sale takes place. This was held to be
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impermissible limitation on the purchaser's right under the first sale
doctrine to distribute his or her lawfully purchased work of art. In 1980 the
Ninth Circuit held in Morseburg v. Balyon that the CRRA was not
preempted under the 1909 Copyright Act because it merely supplemented
copyright law by providing an additional right to the artist, and this royalty
right did not impermissibly restrict resales. 4 The court stated clearly that it
was not addressing whether the CRRA might be preempted under section
301 of the then recently enacted Copyright Act of 1976.15
In 2015, the Ninth Circuit reviewed a lower court decision from a
series of consolidated cases filed in 2011, in which the CRRA was
challenged by art dealers and auction houses. 6 In an en banc ruling, the
court affirmed the district court's holding that the sections of the statute
regulating out-of-state sales were unconstitutional under the Dormant
Commerce Clause but held, contrary to the lower court's decision, that the
CRRA's sections regulating sales within California were severable.17 The
Supreme Court declined to review the Ninth Circuit's ruling. 8 The case
was remanded to the district court, in which the defendants repeated
preemption arguments similar to those made three decades earlier in
Morseburg, while also asserting that the statute was preempted under the
1976 Copyright Act's preemption provision; section 301.19
unconstitutional under the dormant commerce clause. However, an artist's right to a royalty
when his or her art is resold within California was treated as severable; see infra notes 16 to 19
and 96 to 106 and accompanying text.
14. 621 F.2d 972, 978-79 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 983 (1980).
15. Id. at 975 & n.2 (the sales in question were before the Copyright Act of 1976 became
effective on January 1, 1978). See also infra note 87.
16. The cases are Estate of Graham v. Sotheby's Inc., The Sam Francis Foundation v.
Christies, Inc., and Sam Francis Foundation v. eBay Inc. In all three the plaintiffs alleged that
the defendants failed to honor their obligations under the CRRA, and the defendants responded
by arguing that the statute was invalid on several different grounds. The cases were ultimately
consolidated. See infra notes 96 to 106 and accompanying text.
17. Sam Francis Found. v. Christies, Inc., 784 F.3d 1320 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136
S. Ct. 795 (2016). The trial court had held that the provisions regulating sales out of state could
not be severed. Gonzalo Zeballos, "Artists and Auction Houses Declare Victory Over California
Artists' Resale Royalties Statute", MONDAQ (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.mondaq.com/united
states/x/467490/music+arts/Artists+and+Auction+Houses+Declare+Victory+Over+California+Ar
tists+Resale+Royalties+Statute; Dennis Cohen, "Ninth Circuit Draws Fine Line Around Fine Art
Resale Royalties", IP INTELLIGENCE (May 12, 2015), https://www.ipintelligencereport.com/2015/
05/12/ninth-circuit-draws-fine-line-around-fine-art-resale-royalties/.
18. Sam Francis Found. v. Christies, Inc., 784 F.3d 1320 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136
S. Ct. 795 (2016); Brian Boucher, Supreme Court Declines to Hear Artists' Resale Royalty Suit -
Who Wins?, ART WORLD (Jan. 12, 2016), https://news.artnet.com/art-world/supreme-court-
declines-artists-resale-royalty-appeal-406106. See generally Register's Update, supra note 1, at
21 -22.
19. Eric Hiatt, "Validity of California Resale Royalty Act Faces Another Court Challenge",
COPYRIGHT, CONTENT, AND PLATFORMS (Feb. 26, 2016), http://www.copyrightcontentplatforms.
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On remand, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California held in Estate of Graham v. Sotheby's Inc. that recent decisions
of the U.S. Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit "have so eroded
Morseburg that it no longer represents a binding interpretation of the first
sale doctrine and the CRRA. ' ,20 The court ultimately held that the CRRA
was preempted because it conflicted with the first sale doctrine codified in
section 109 of the Copyright Act, and also because the artists' claims for
unpaid royalties under the CRRA were independently preempted under
section 301(a). The court said the artists' claims were not qualitatively
different from garden variety copyright claims.21
The Estate of Graham decision certainly will be reviewed by the
Ninth Circuit and might eventually find its way to the Supreme Court. The
high court has not addressed a preemption issue in the general field of
intellectual property since the Bonito Boats decision in 1989,22 and it has
never addressed a preemption issue arising under section 301 of the
Copyright Act of 1976. The focus of this article is not about whether the
United States should implement droit de suite.2 3  Rather, this article
concentrates on two relatively narrow questions: (1) whether the CRRA is
preempted under the Constitution's Supremacy Clause (conflict
preemption) because it disrupts Congress's efforts to balance the interests
of copyright right owners and consumers; and (2) whether it is preempted
under section 301 of the Copyright Act (express preemption). This article
concludes that the federal district court in Estate of Graham arrived at the
right conclusion: the CRRA, California's droit de suite statute, is
preempted under either section 301 of the Copyright Act or under conflict
preemption analysis because the statute frustrates the purposes of copyright
law's well-established first sale doctrine.
com/2016/02/validity-of-califomia-resale-royalty-act-faces-another-court-challenge/; Howard B.
Abrams, 1 The Law of Copyright § 5:188 (2015).
20. 2016 WL 1464229, at *6 (C.D. Cal. 2016), motion to alter and amend denied, 2016 WL
4136540 (C.D. Cal. 2016).
21. 2016 WL 1464229, at *9.
22. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); PAUL GOLDSTEIN
& R. ANTHONY REESE, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES
642-79 (Foundation Press, 7th ed. 2012), (coverage of the U.S. Supreme Court's intellectual
property preemption decisions from Sears in 1964 through Bonito Boats in 1989).
23. There is abundant literature arguing for and against recognition of droit de suite in the
United States. See, e.g., Gordon Katz, Copyright Preemption Under the Copyright Act of 1976:
The Case of Droit de Suite, 47 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 200 (1978), Monroe Price, Government
Policy and Economic Security for Artists: The Case of Droit de Suite, 77 YALE L.J. 1333 (1968),
Carole Vickers, The Applicability of Droit de Suite In the United States, 3 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 433 (1980), Kathryn Bue, Comment, The Droit de Suite Has Arrived: Can It Thrive in
California As It Has in Calais? 11 CREIGHTON L. REv. 529 (1977), Register's 1992 Report,
supra note 7, at 149 - 51; Register's Update, supra note 1, at 4 - 10.
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Part One of this article provides background on droit de suite and its
lack of recognition in the United States.24 Part Two explains the tension
between the resale royalty and copyright principles, particularly the first
sale doctrine. Parts Three and Four discuss conflict preemption, the
Morseburg decision from 1980, and whether Morseburg is still good law
on preemption. Part Five of this article discusses whether the CRRA is
subject to express preemption by section 301(a) of the Copyright Act. Part
Six of the article discusses several other arguments for and against
preemption of the CRRA. The Conclusion ties these parts together and
explains why, on balance, the California statute is subject to conflict
preemption under the Supremacy Clause and express preemption under the
Copyright Act.
II. A Brief History of Resale Royalty in the United States
Droit de suite, first introduced in France in the 1920s, gives visual
artists-primarily painters and sculptors-the right to benefit financially
from the increased value of their works over time by granting them a
percentage of the proceeds each time one of their original works is resold.25
"[I]n other words when an owner of the art object sells it to a third party (if
the seller makes a profit), the artist receives a payment., 26
Resale royalty rights derive from moral rights. The two fundamental
moral rights protect the attribution privilege-paternity-and against the
mutilation of works-integrity-while droit de suite enables artists to
27benefit from the appreciation in the value of their works of art. It is an
economic right with a moral rights heritage. 28 The rationale for providing
this royalty is based on recognition that unlike authors and composers who
are able to offer thousands of copies of their works to the public, artists
create a limited number of unique works. An author and his or her
publisher may sell many copies of the same novel; a composer's popular
song may be downloaded repeatedly and performed publicly over and over,
both generating substantial royalties; and a movie may be shown in
hundreds of theaters across the nation while thousands of DVDs of the film
may be sold. In each of these transactions, many members of the general
public are enjoying the same work and the creator is compensated for many
of these uses. On the other hand, visual artists cannot generally rely on
24. As in the Ninth Circuit's 1980 preemption decision concerning the CRRA, resolution of
the dispute over the need for resale royalty legislation is not necessary for purposes of this article.
Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d 972, 976 (1980).
25. Register's Update, supra note 1, at 4.
26. Corporate Counsel's Guide to Copyright Law, Resale Royalties § 4:14 (2015).
27. Register's Update, supra note 1, at 4.
28. G.L. Francione, supra note 13, at 109 - 10.
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repeated uses of their unique works. The visual artist is compensated when
he or she sells a painting or sculptural work but, for the most part, the
artist's compensation ends because the artist has but one financial interest,
or perhaps an interest in a few limited editions of a numbered print or
sculptural work.29 Over time, as an artist's reputation grows and his or her
works appreciate in value, the person who stands to gain from subsequent
sales of those appreciated paintings and sculptural works is the collector,
not the visual artist who created the work. 30  Resale royalty laws address
this disparity in how copyright law protects and rewards visual artists
compared to authors, composers and other creators. 31 Hence, droit de suite
can be justified as compensation for the lack of a marketable reproduction
right for many works of fine art.32
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works was amended in 1948 to include droit de suite; Article 14 of the
Convention provides creators of original works of art and original
manuscripts with an inalienable right to an interest in any subsequent sale
of the work after its first transfer by the creator.33 The resale right is
optional, meaning that Berne's member states are not required to
implement droit de suite.34  Still, at least 70 countries currently have
legislation protecting artists' resale royalty rights.35 Droit de suite is well-
established in Europe and the European Union ("EU") harmonized droit de
suite laws in 2001, notwithstanding hesitation from the "United Kingdom
("UK"). The United States has been adhering to the Berne Convention
since 1989 but Congress has not enacted droit de suite legislation.36 The
Berne Convention also makes droit de suite a reciprocal right. This means
29. Register's Update, supra note 1, at 10 - 11; Register's 1992 Report, supra note 7, at
125.
30. Register's Update, supra note 1, at 11. "An increase in the price of an artist's works
after they have left his hands may be the result of greater recognition of the artist, an increase in
the overall demand for art works, inflation, unpredictable shifts in fashion and taste, or some
combination of the above." Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d at 976
31. Paul Katzenberger, The Droit de Suite in Copyright Law, 4 IIC, INT'L REV. OF INDUS.
PROP. AND COPYRIGHT LAW 361, 368 (1973).
32. Register's 1992 Report, supra note 7, at 125 - 26. Royalty rights are needed because
artists are not adequately compensated for their contributions to society due to complex factors
determining the value of original works of art and because existing forms of protection-
copyright law and contract law-have not helped because original works of visual art are not
often reproduced and artists often lack bargaining power. Sharon Emley, The Resale Royalties
Act: Paintings, Preemption and Profit, 8 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 239, 240 - 40 (1978)
(hereinafter Emley).
33. Register's Update, supra note 1, at 4.
34. Id. at4 -5.
35. Id. at 13 - 19; Zeballos, supra note 17.
36. Craig Joyce et al., Copyright Law 33 - 38 (9th Edition 2013), LexisNexis (discussion of
the United States becoming a signatory to the Berne Convention).
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that if a member state does not grant a resale royalty, its citizens cannot
benefit from the right in other countries which have enacted droit de suite.
Since Congress has not enacted resale royalty, artists from the U.S. do not
earn royalties from resale of their works in countries with resale royalty
protection.3 7
Bills to amend the Copyright Act to provide for resale royalties were
introduced as early as 1978.38 When Congress enacted the Visual Artists
Rights Act in 1990, it directed the Register of Copyrights to study the
feasibility of implementing resale royalty legislation in the United States.39
The Register concluded in 1992 that droit de suite might not be an
appropriate addition to U.S. copyright law because it would not fit well
with our free market traditions. 40  However, two decades later, after
updating that 1992 study, the Register changed course to state that it
"supports the right as one alternative to address the disparity in treatment of
artists under the copyright law. 41 Still, Congress has not acted.
Efforts to incorporate this concept in state law in the United States
have not been successful but for the California statute, which is the primary
focus of this article. However, legislation was introduced in 11 other states
including New York and Illinois.42 The California Resale Royalty Act
(CRRA), which applies to fine art-defined as original paintings,
sculptures, drawings and glass works-requires the seller of fine art to pay
the artist a 5% royalty when a work is resold in California or resold
anywhere by a California resident.43 This right cannot be waived unless
there is a written contract providing for a royalty in excess of 5%.44 The
seller of the art work, or that seller's agent, is required upon a sale to
withhold 5% of the sale price, find the artist, and then pay the artist. If the
artist is not paid, he or she may bring a civil action for damages. The
CRRA also provides that the prevailing party shall be entitled to attorney's
37. Register's Update, supra note 1, at 4 - 5.
38. Id. at 6 - 10 and 23 - 25 (discussing proposed legislation).
39. The Register's 1992 study of resale royalty legislation was the result of section 608 of
the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (legislation that amended the Copyright Act to add limited
protection of artists' moral rights). This section required the Register of Copyrights to study the
feasibility of implementing a resale royalty right for visual artists in the United States.
40. Register's 1992 Report, supra note 7, Executive Summary at xiv-xv. See also
Register's Update, supra note 1, at 8.
41. Register's Update, supra note 1, at 3. See generally Herbert Lazerow, Art Resale
Royalty Options, 63 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 201 (2016) (a comprehensive discussion of possible
legislation with comparison to laws in Australia, England, France as well as California).
42. Register's 1992 Report, supra note 7, at 75.
43. Cal. Civ. Code § 986(a). The act is applicable only if at the time of resale the artist is
either a citizen of the United States or a resident of California for a minimum of two years. Id. §
986(c)(1).
44. Id. § 986(a).
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fees. This royalty right succeeds to the artist's heirs for 20 years after the
artist's death.45  Artists' rights to this royalty do not depend on their
retaining copyright to their works of art.46
III. The CRRA/Copyright Conflicts
The CRRA is limited to the resale of paintings, sculptural works, and
drawings.47 Such works fall within the Copyright Act's "pictorial, graphic,
and sculptural work" category of copyrightable subject matter,48 and are
defined as follows:
... two-dimensional and three-dimensional works of fine,
graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art
reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and
49technical drawings, including architectural plans....
The owner of copyright in a pictorial, graphic or sculptural work has
the right to reproduce the work in copies, to prepare derivative works based
upon the work, to distribute copies of the work to the public, and to display
the work publicly.50
Section 202 of the Copyright Act provides:
Ownership of a copyright.., is distinct from ownership of any
material object in which the work is embodied. Transfer of
ownership of any material object, including the copy or
phonorecord in which the work is first fixed, does not of itself
convey any rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the
object; nor, in the absence of an agreement, does transfer of
ownership of a copyright.., convey property rights in any
material object.51
Hence, the purchaser of a painting or sculptural work from an artist
owns the object but not the copyright unless the artist transfers some or all
of the rights in the copyright bundle. The purchaser cannot reproduce the
painting, modify it or, subject to certain limitations, publicly display it
without the artist's permission. These are some of the exclusive rights that
the artist retains even though he or she no longer possesses the tangible
45. Id. §§ 986(a) & (b). See generally Register's 1992 Report, supra note 7, at 65 - 68.
46. Register's Update, supra note 1, at 20 - 21. See generally G.L. Francione, supra note
13, at 106 & n.6 (summary of the California law).
47. Cal. Civ. Code § 986(c)(2).
48. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5).
49. Id. § 101 (definitions).
50. Id. §§ 106(1), (2), (3) & (5).
51. Id. § 202.
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object. Section 202 reversed a common law copyright doctrine in some
jurisdictions that established that artists were presumed to transfer their
52
rights when they sold their works of art. Under the Copyright Act, a
transfer of copyright ownership is not valid unless it is in writing, signed by
the owner of the rights being conveyed.5 3
The right at issue with resale royalty statutes is the copyright holder's
exclusive right to "distribute copies.., of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or
lending. 54
The Copyright Act defines "copies" as:
material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is
fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from
which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device. The term "copies" includes the material object, other than
a phonorecord, in which the work is first fixed.55
Combining the distribution right with the definition of "copies" means
that an artist has the right to decide when to sell his or her painting or
sculptural work. The distribution right, also called "the right of first
publication," "implicates a threshold decision by the author whether and in
what form to release his work. First publication is inherently different from
other § 106 rights in that only one person can be the first publisher. 5 6
The distribution right is limited by the first sale doctrine, codified at
section 109(a). It provides:
[n]otwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a
particular copy.., lawfully made under this title.., is entitled
without authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise
dispose of the possession of that copy....
The first sale doctrine provides that "once the copyright owner places
a copyrighted item in the stream of commerce by selling it, he has
exhausted his exclusive statutory right to control its distribution. ' 7 The
doctrine was recognized by the Supreme Court in 1908 in Bobbs-Merrill
Co. v. Straus58 in which the exclusive right to vend under the pre-1909
52. Pushman v. N.Y. Graphic Soc, 39 N.E.2d 249 (N.Y. 1942); Katz, supra note 23, at 201.
53. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a).
54. Id. § 106(3).
55. Id. § 101 (definition of "copies").
56. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 553 (1985).
57. Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'Anza Research Int'l, Inc. 523 U.S. 135, 152 (1998).
58. See 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
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statute was interpreted as limited to the initial sale of the work, but not
resales. The doctrine was codified in section 27 of the Copyright Act of
1909 and then reaffirmed in section 109(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976.
The Supreme Court has stated that the first sale doctrine creates robust
secondary markets by "leaving buyers of goods free to compete with each
other when reselling or otherwise disposing of those goods." It shifts
market power away from copyright owners to competitors in order to
"59
"advantage ... the consumer.
What does this mean for visual artists and their paintings and
sculptural works? Sections 202 and 109(a) combine to mean that the
purchaser of a painting or sculptural work is free to sell or otherwise
dispose of that work of art-the object-without permission of the artist
even when the artist retains the copyright on that work of art. However, the
purchaser/owner cannot reproduce the painting as a poster or greeting card,
or adapt it for a wallpaper pattern or fabric design, without the artist's
permission. Also, the purchaser/owner of the object-the work of art-can
also display it, either directly or by projection of a single image, to viewers
present at the place where the object is located without infringing on the
artist's right to control public displays of the work.60 The basic principle of
first sale is that the buyer of a copyrighted work like a painting is free to
dispose of it as he or she wishes without regard to the wishes of the
copyright holder.6 1 The artist/copyright holder cannot use the distribution
right to fix resale prices in downstream markets because that right is
limited to the first sale of the work.62
The conflict preemption issue is whether California's droit de suite
statute is at odds with fundamental copyright principles by simultaneously:
(1) improperly enhancing an artist's distribution right; and (2) improperly
limiting a purchaser's first sale right under section 109(a) to distribute his
or her lawfully purchased copy of a work of art. Or in other words, to sell
the object. Is the statute an impermissible restraint on alienation? Does it
undermine first sale and the principle of free alienation of personal property
by preventing buyers of fine art from acquiring unencumbered title to a
work of fine art?
63
59. Kirtsaeng. v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1363 (2013).
60. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) as limited by 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). Assuming the work of visual art
comes within the scope of VARA, the artist also retains his moral rights of integrity and
attribution whether or not he or she assigns copyright to the purchaser of the work of art. Id. §
106A. See also The Empty Promise, supra note 3, at 993 -94.
61. Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1355; Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 776 F.3d 692,
695 (9th Cir. 2015).
62. Omega S.A., 776 F.3d at 695.
63. Register's Update, supra note 1, at 58.
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The express preemption issue turns on the interpretation and
application of section 301 (a) of the Copyright Act, which provides:
all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified
by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible
medium of expression and come within the subject matter of
copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created
before or after that date, [January 1, 1978] and whether published
or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter,
no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any
such work under the common law or statutes of any State.
Section 301 reflects congressional intent to preempt and abolish state
common law copyright and any rights under common law or statute that are
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights enjoyed by copyright owners and
that extend to works coming within the scope of copyright law. 64 Deciding
whether a state law claim is preempted under section 301(a) has two steps;
both of which must be satisfied. A court first has to determine whether the
subject matter of the state claim falls within the subject matter of copyright
under section 102. This is a given with the CRRA because the subject
matter of an artist's claim for unpaid resale royalties is a copyrighted work
65
of fine art. The second inquiry is whether the right being asserted is
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights contained in section 106. If it is,
then the state law claim is preempted.66 If the state law claim is, in essence,
qualitatively no different from a copyright infringement claim, it will be
67preempted. This is also shown by section 301(b) which provides that
states may protect rights and interests which are not equivalent to those
protected by federal copyright law. "Therefore, only the equivalency
requirement of the statutory test need be considered. If the rights conferred
by [the CRRA] are equivalent to those conferred by the Copyright Act...
the CRRA is preempted.6 8
64. H.R. REP. NO. 1476-94, at 31 (1976) [hereinafter H.R. REP.].
65. Emley, supra note 32, at 254.
66. Laws v. Sony Music Entertainment, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 2006).
67. Id. at 1144.
68. Emley, supra note 32, at 254. The CRRA's sponsor in the California legislature
acknowledged that the law might be preempted by the Copyright Act. G.L Francione, supra note
13, at 107 n.6.
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IV. Morseburg v. Balyon and Conflict Preemption
Preemption doctrine, derived from the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, nullifies a state statute or common law that frustrates
accomplishing the objectives of an act of Congress.69 "[T]he extent to
which the federal laws has 'occupied the field' and the presence of
'conflict' between the federal and state laws have always been focuses of
analytic attention. The nature of the Court's emphasis at a particular time
is revealed by whether 'occupation of the field' and 'conflict' are easily
found to exist or not.",70 The Supreme Court has decided seven cases since
1964 involving the preemption of state law affecting some type of
intellectual property. The Court's initial rulings in the companion cases of
Sears and Compco seemed strong and unambiguous: a state cannot prevent
the copying of an article unprotected by a patent or copyright under its law
of unfair competition. 71 This promoted national uniformity. However, it
soon became clear that these decisions did not prevent the states from
providing limited forms of protection to subject matter which falls within
the patent and copyright domains. For example, dicta in Lear, Inc. v.
Adkins72 recognized a state's power to enforce a promise to pay royalties
for use of an unpatentable invention while the patent application was
pending. These decisions promoted federalism.73
When analyzing the CRRA it becomes especially relevant to consider
Goldstein v. California,74 in which the Court held that the Constitution's
grant of copyright power to Congress was not exclusive. The defendants
argued that the Copyright Act of 1909, which excluded sound recordings
from its coverage, preempted state protection of those "writings, 75 but the
Court upheld California's statute, which made record piracy a criminal
76offense. It said that the states retained concurrent power to protect some
works of authorship if such protection did not conflict with federal law. 77 It
saw no Congressional intent to foreclose state regulation of sound
recordings-a category of writings left unprotected by Congress at that
time-so long as state regulation did not interfere with federal copyright
69. Hines v. Davidovwitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
70. Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d at 976.
71. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Ralph Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA L.
REv. 1341, 1359 (1987).
72. 395 U.S. 653, 674-75 (1969).
73. Cf Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d at 976.
74. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
75. Id. at 566.
76. Id. at570- 71.
77. Id. at 552- 61.
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law policy. 78 Nothing indicated that sound recordings had to be free of
state control. 79 The states could thus afford copyright-like protection to
these published writings that did not, at that time, fall within the scope of
federal copyright law. However, the Court also noted that "a conflict
[leading to preemption] would develop if a state attempted to protect that
which Congress intended to be free from restraint or to free that which
Congress had protected." 80
The other post-Sears and Compco decisions; Kewanee Oil v. Bicron
Corp., Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., and Bonito Boats v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc. demonstrate that the Supreme Court regards state and
federal regulation of intellectual property as concurrent. 81 Federal controls
do not displace a state's statutory or common law forms of protection
merely because the state doctrine is related to intellectual property
potentially eligible for patent or copyright protection.82 State regulation of
intellectual property is preempted when it conflicts with the objectives of
federal law. 83  State law must give way when it disrupts the delicate
balance between the copyright holders and the general public that Congress
seeks to maintain when promulgating copyright law.
84
The first version of the CRRA was upheld against a preemption
challenge over 35 years ago in Morseburg v. Baylon, 85 due in large part to
the Supreme Court's Goldstein decision. 86 The suit was filed by a Los
Angeles art dealer who had sold two paintings in 1977, triggering his
obligation to pay royalties under the statute. He sought a declaratory
judgment that the law was preempted by the Copyright Act of 1909.87 The
78. Id. at 564-69; see also Morseburg, 621 F.2d at 977 (saying that Congress had evidenced
no intent to bar states from exercising their power-so the area had not been fully controlled by
federal authority).
79. 412 U.S. at 566.
80. Id. at 559.
81. 416 U.S. 470 (1974); 440 U.S. 257 (1979); 489 U.S. 141 (1989). In these cases, state
law affords protection to subject matter that was unprotected by copyright or design patent as a
matter of federal law.
82. 440 U.S. at 266.
83. Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. at 479.
84. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152 (1989). See
generally David E. Shipley, Refusing To Rock The Boat: The Sears/Compco Preemption Doctrine
Applied To Bonito Boats V. Thunder Craft, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 385, 387 - 91 (1990)
[hereinafter "Rock the Boat"].
85. CV 77-2410, 1978 WL 980 *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 1978), aff'd, 621 F.2d 972 (9th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 983 (1980).
86. "We hold that Goldstein governs this case." Morseburg v. Baylon, 621 F.2d at 977.
87. 1978 WL 980, at *2. He also claimed that the law unduly burdened interstate
commerce, deprived him of property without due process, and retroactively altered the terms of
the contract by which he bought the works of art. The district court ruled against him on all of
these challenges but did not reach the commerce clause issue because the transactions took place
2017
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
distribution right was called "the right to vend" in section 1 of the 1909
statute, and the first sale doctrine was codified at section 27 that provided:
"but nothing in this title shall be deemed to forbid, prevent, or restrict the
transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work the possession of which has
been lawfully obtained." The art dealer argued that the CRRA impaired an
artist's ability to vend his works of fine art, and also restricted the transfer
of the work when in the hands of someone, like him, who had lawfully
obtained the work from the artist. And thus, the CRRA conflicted with the
1909 Act and should be preempted. 88
The lower court concluded that the CRRA was not preempted,
reasoning that no congressional intent was present seeking to regulate the
sale of works of art. In addition, the statute did not affect the compensation
the artist received on making the first transfer of the art work so it did not
conflict with the right to vend. The court did not address the alleged
conflict with first sale but stated that the CRRA did not frustrate federal
objectives; rather, it encouraged the production and distribution of
copyrightable works of fine art, and helped reward artists for their creative
efforts.89
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, relying heavily on the Supreme Court's
1973 decision in Goldstein that had upheld California's record piracy
statute against a preemption challenge. After discussing the CRRA and the
U.S. Supreme Court's approach to preemption, the court said that the case
was governed by Goldstein and that neither the Copyright Clause nor the
1909 Act prevented California from enacting the statute.90 In regard to the
alleged conflict with the right to vend, the court held that an artist who
creates a copyrighted work of fine art has, prior to its sale, title to that work
and all the rights given by copyright. These rights did not include the right
afforded by the CRRA which was seen "as an additional right similar to the
protection afforded by California's anti-pirating statute upheld in
Goldstein."9 1 In passing the CRRA, as when it enacted the anti-piracy
statute, California had acted in an area left unattended by Congress. The
fact that this additional right could not be waived or transferred did not
within California. 1978 WL 980, at *4; Emley, supra note 32, at 259 - 60. The 1909 Act applied
because the claim arose before January 1, 1978, the effective date of the 1976 Act. 1978 WL
980, at *3. The 1976 Act does not apply to causes of action arising from undertakings
commenced before January 1, 1978. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(2).
88. Morseburg, 621 F.2d at 975.
89. 1978 WL 980, at *2. See Emley, supra note 32, at 260. The district court also
suggested that the CRRA would not be preempted under the Copyright Act of 1976, stating "it
appears that the Resale Royalties Act is not preempted by the Revision Act of 1976." 1978 WL
980, at *3; Emley, supra note 32, at 260.
90. Morseburg, 621 F.2d. at 977.
91. Id.
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limit any right created by federal law. Moreover, the court said that the
California statute did not impair the artist's "'exclusive right to transfer the
title for consideration to others' because "it merely create[d] a right in
personam against a seller of a 'work of fine art.' 92 In short, the CRRA did
not prevent the creator from vending his or her work.
In regard to the first sale doctrine the court concluded that section 27
of the Copyright Act of 1909 did not, by implication, preclude states from
passing resale royalty legislation because it did not "technically speaking"
restrict the transfer of works of art.93 It explained that the CRRA did not
restrict transfer because no lien attached to the art object and the buyer was
not secondarily liable for the royalty. In addition, the fact that resale might
create a liability to the artist and simultaneously be the "exercise of a right
guaranteed by the Copyright Act," did not make the artist's right to the
royalty a legal restraint on the dealer's right to sell the work.9 4 In short, the
statute was not preempted by the Copyright Act of 1909 because imposing
the royalty did not impermissibly restrict the owner's right to resell the
work.
However, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that imposing the royalty
could influence behavior by purchasers of fine art who later considered
selling their works, but that these possibilities-a longer holding period to
defer the sale until greater appreciation in its value and the impact on the
volume of business in a particular art market-did not prevent the court
from concluding that "the 1909 Copyright Act has not occupied the area
with which we are concerned and the California Act is not in conflict with
it." It said that "the two laws function harmoniously rather than
discordantly." 95 The Copyright Act was not hostile to the state's resale
royalty.96 As noted earlier, the Ninth Circuit was explicit that it was not
considering whether the CRRA might be preempted under section 301 of
the then recently enacted Copyright Act of 1976. 97
About thirty years later, a California federal district court held in Baby
Moose Drawings, Inc. v. Dean Valentine in 2011, that the CRRA was not
preempted by copyright law.98 The court relied on the House Judiciary
92. ld.
93. ld.
94. ld. at 977 - 78.
95. Id. at 978. See also Register's 1992 Report, supra note 7, at 81 - 83.
96. Morseburg, 621 F.2d at 978.
97. ld. at 975; see also supra note 87. The transaction at issue took place prior to the
enactment of the 1976 Act. Register's Update, supra note 1, at 21. The court also found that the
CRRA did not violate the contracts or due process clauses of the Constitution. 621 F.2d at 979 -
80.
98. No. 2:ll-cv-00697-JHN-JCGx, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72583 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1,
2011) [hereinafter "Baby Moose"].
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Committee Report on the enactment of the Visual Artists Rights Act of
1990 to find that "Congress clearly intended for the Royalty Act to
withstand preemption by the Copyright Act," noting that the Committee
understood that the Copyright Act "will not preempt a cause of action
for.., a right to a resale royalty" under the CRRA. 99 However, neither the
CRRA nor Baby Moose fared well in three related actions which were filed
in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California in 2011. The
cases are Estate of Graham v. Sotheby's Inc., The Sam Francis Foundation
v. Christie's, Inc. and The Sam Francis Foundation v. eBay Inc. In all
three cases, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants-two auction houses
and an online retailer-failed to honor their obligations under the CRRA. 100
The efforts of these several defendants to have the statute struck down
were partially successful. Since the CRRA regulated transactions taking
place outside California as well as in-state sales, the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California held the entire statute unconstitutional for
violating the Dormant Commerce Clause. 101  Baby Moose was
distinguished as not being relevant to the Dormant Commerce Clause
challenge.10 2 The Ninth Circuit, in an en banc ruling, affirmed the lower
court's decision striking down the sections of the CRRA regulating out-of-
state sales, but held that the sections of the statute regulating sales within
California were severable. 10 3  This brought the CRRA back to life in
California to the extent it regulated sellers residing in the state or sales
taking place in the state. After the Supreme Court declined to review the
Ninth Circuit's ruling, 10 4 the case was remanded to the district court where
the defendants made their arguments as to whether the remaining parts of
99. Id. at *9-'10 (citation omitted); Register's Update, supra note 1, at 22 & n.147. A
resale royalty provision was removed by Congress from the version of the bill that became the
Visual Artist's Rights Act of 1990. Register's Update, supra note 1, at 7.
100. The three cases were consolidated in one action, with the defendants moving to dismiss
the complaints on several grounds including violation of the commerce clause, unlawful taking of
private property, and federal preemption. Case Summary, Estate of Robert Graham v. Sotheby's,
IFAR (International Foundation for Art Research, May 27, 2016 (discussing Sam Francis
Foundation et al. v. Christies, Inc., 784 F.3d 1320 (9th Cir. 2015).
101. Estate of Graham v. Sotheby's, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1126 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
102. Id. at 1122 n.4; Register's Update, supra note 1, at 21 - 22.
103. Sam Francis Foundation v. Christie's, 784 F.3d 1320, 1323-26 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
The trial court held that the provisions regulating sales out of state could not be severed. See also
Gonzalo Zeballos, supra note 17. Dennis Cohen, Ninth Circuit Draws Fine Line Around Fine Art
Resale Royalties, IP INTELLIGENCE (May 12, 2015).
104. Sam Francis Foundation v. Christie's, 136 S. Ct. 795 (2016); Brian Boucher, Supreme
Court Declines to Hear Artists' Resale Royalty Suit - Who Wins?, ART WORLD (Jan. 12, 2016).
See generally Register's Update, supra note 1, at 21 - 22.
[39:1
DROIT DE SUITE, COPYRIGHT'S FIRST SALE DOCTRINE
the statute were preempted under section 301 of the Copyright Act or the
Supremacy Clause. 
105
On remand, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California held in Estate of Graham v. Sotheby's Inc. that recent decisions
of the U.S. Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit dealing with first sale
"have so eroded Morseburg that it no longer represents a binding
interpretation of the first sale doctrine and the CRRA." 10 6 The district court
ultimately held that the CRRA was preempted because it conflicted with
the first sale doctrine codified in section 109 of the Copyright Act, and also
because the artists' claims for unpaid royalties under the CRRA were
independently preempted under the Copyright Act's preemption provision,
section 301, because they were not qualitatively different from garden
variety copyright claims. 10 7 The next two parts of this article focus on
whether that federal district court got it right. Part Four explains that
notwithstanding Morseburg, the CRRA is preempted under conflict
preemption analysis, and Part Five explains why the CRRA is subject to
express preemption under section 301.
V. Morseburg and Conflict Preemption Redux
Is the Ninth Circuit's conflict preemption analysis in Morseburg still
good? Assuming that the Estate of Graham decision is reviewed by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, can it justify overruling the
Ninth Circuit panel which decided Morseburg in 1980? Yes; things have
changed since 1980.
A. The Law of the Circuit
There is a rule of appellate procedure called the law of the circuit
doctrine which decrees that the decision of a three judge panel of the circuit
is the decision of that circuit; another three-judge panel of the circuit
should be reluctant to overrule it. 10 8 "[T]he same issue presented in a later
case in the same court should lead to the same result."10 9 This rule exists in
the federal system to ensure consistency within a circuit. When one panel
speaks on a matter of law, subsequent panels should conform so litigants do
not have to confront contrary legal interpretations within the same circuit.
105. Eric Hiatt, Baker & Hostetler, VALIDITY OF CALIFORNIA RESALE ROYALTY ACT FACES
ANOTHER COURT CHALLENGE, AIPLA NEWSSTAND (Feb. 26, 2016); Howard B. Abrams, 1 The
Law of Copyright § 5:188 (2015).
106. 2016 WL 1464229, at *6 (C.D. Cal. 2016).
107. Id. at*9.
108. LaShawn v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1395 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (describing how one circuit
panel should be reluctant to overrule another circuit panel's decision).
109. Id. at 1393 (emphasis in the original).
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A later panel can express disagreement with the reasoning of the earlier
decision, but should nevertheless go along with that earlier interpretation. 11 0
As stated by the D.C. Circuit, "[w]ere matters otherwise, the finality of our
appellate decisions would yield to constant conflicts within the circuit."111
This doctrine explains why the district court's opinion in Estate of
Graham devotes a hefty amount of effort explaining that the Ninth
Circuit's reasoning in Morseburg v. Balyon is no longer binding nor
persuasive. 112 The doctrine also explains why the district court concluded
that the CRRA was preempted under section 301(a) of the Copyright Act,
whether or not Morseburg is still binding in the Ninth Circuit 113 The
district court stated that its conclusion about the Morseburg decision was
"consistent with settled law [in the Ninth Circuit] permitting district courts
and three-judge panels to disregard circuit precedent that is irreconcilable
with later decisions of either the Supreme Court or the Ninth Circuit sitting
en banc.''114  The court devoted several paragraphs to discussing a
relatively recent Ninth Circuit en banc ruling in which the court told a
three-judge panel that it should not have felt bound by an earlier Ninth
Circuit holding because of two intervening U.S. Supreme Court
decisions.1 15 The district court went on to say that Morseburg had been
undercut by the Supreme Court's intervening first sale precedent "in more
obvious ways," noting that the Morseburg panel barely mentioned the
purpose of the first sale doctrine and the principle that copyright holders
cannot use their rights to fix resale prices downstream. 116
Accordingly, the ability of the district court in Estate of Graham to
escape the Kirtsaeng ruling depends upon the strength of its conflict
preemption analysis showing that the Ninth Circuit's 1980 analysis of the
CRRA, first sale and the right to vend is no longer good law due to the
Supreme Court's Quality King and Kirtsaeng decisions. As discussed
below, much of the conflict preemption analysis in Estate of Graham is
110. J. Robert Brown, Jr., "Conflict Minerals, the DC Circuit, and the SEC: The Law of the
Circuit Doctrine," THE RACE TO THE BOTTOM (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.theracetothebottom
.org/home/conflict-minerals-the-dc-circuit-and-the- sec-the-law-of-the.html.
111. LaShawn, 87 F.3d at 1395.
112. 2016 WL 1464229, at *6 -*8.
113. Id. at*8 - *11.
114. Ld. at *7 (citing Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003)).
115. Id. (discussing Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2003), in which the court, en
banc, told a three judge panel that it should not have been bound by the 1989 ruling in Babcock v.
Taylor due to decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1993 and 1997).
116. Id. at *8. The district court reiterated its "law of the circuit" analysis and discussion
when it later denied plaintiffs' motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 2016 WL 4136540 (C.D. Cal. 2016). The court said it
would prefer to follow Morseburg in order to be more respectful of Ninth Circuit authority, but it
had a fundament duty to follow Miller and Supreme Court precedent. Ild. at * 1.
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solid but the court may have relied too heavily on the U.S. Supreme
Court's first sale decisions, which were concerned primarily with the
unauthorized importation of copyrighted goods and the gray market.'1 17 The
plaintiffs in those cases wanted to block the resale of copyrighted goods
completely while the artist plaintiffs seeking to enforce the CRRA are
enthusiastic about the resale of their copyrighted works of visual art. They
only want their resale royalties. Quality King and Kirtsaeng are persuasive
authority but not directly on point.
B. The Impact of the Supreme Court's First Sale Decisions
The most important section of the district court's opinion in the Estate
of Graham preemption ruling is the discussion of the Supreme Court's
decisions on the first sale doctrine which, according to the court, teach that
the "doctrine does not simply create a void to be filled by state regulations"
and have "so eroded Morseburg that it no longer represents a binding
interpretation of the first sale doctrine and the CRRA. ' ' u 8 Accordingly, the
CRRA conflicts with the first sale doctrine and should be preempted.
In Estate of Graham the court was correct to acknowledge that first
sale as codified in section 109(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976 is the same
as the first sale doctrine that Congress had codified in section 27 of the
Copyright Act of 1909.119 It then explained that the Supreme Court has
discussed the first sale doctrine several times since Morseburg was decided
in 1980 and these rulings, Quality King in 1998 and Kirtsaeng in 2013,
undermine the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the CRRA and first sale
function harmoniously. The essence of the court's analysis is that the
CRRA is not a valid regulation because the Copyright Act is hostile to a
royalty scheme.1 20 The situation is no longer analogous to what was at
issue in Goldstein when Congress had not extended protection to sound
recordings, leaving the area unattended. The Court stated in Goldstein that
"a conflict could develop if a State attempted to protect that which
Congress intended to be free from restraint"1 2 1 and it is now clear that the
CRRA is encroaching on "subject matter Congress expressly addressed in §
109(a)." 122 The court is saying, in essence, that the Supreme Court made
this interpretation of section 109 clear in 1998 and again in 2013.
117. See infra notes 127 to 151 and accompanying text.
118. 2016 WL 1464229, at *8.
119. Id.
120. Id. at *6 -*7. Cf Morseburg, 621 F.2d at 978.
121. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 559.
122. 2016 WL 1464229, at *6.
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Arguably, the silence of the Copyright Act and its legislative history
regarding droit de suite allows state regulation of resale royalty, 12 but the
current act was passed in 1976, decades before the Supreme Court's
statements about first sale regulation in Quality King and Kirtsaeng. These
rulings show that "the doctrine embodies a delicate distribution of rights
between copyright holders and downstream resellers, 'leaving buyers of
goods free to compete with each other [in the secondary market].'
124
Although the CRRA does not, technically, restrict transfers of art, 125 the
Ninth Circuit's opinion in the Sam Francis Foundation Dormant
Commerce Clause case concluded, contrary to Morseburg, that the CRRA
regulates commercial transactions between resellers and buyers and
restricts conduct among private parties. 126  The conflict preemption
argument against the CRRA is that the statute regulates an area that is
already regulated by Congress; sections 106(3) and 109(a) of the Copyright
Act combine to give purchasers of copyrighted art works the right to resell
those objects without any limits on alienation while the CRRA
impermissibly restricts downstream transactions. 127
The district court's discussion of the Supreme Court's first sale
decisions and how the CRRA restricts the transfer of art works 12 is
convincing but perhaps overstates the sweep of these first sale holdings.
The Quality King and Kirtsaeng cases involved efforts by copyright owners
to block the resale in the United States of their copyrighted works which
had been acquired by the defendant resellers overseas. Both cases required
the Court to interpret and apply not only sections 106(3) and 109(a) but
also section 602(a)(1) which deals with the importation of copyrighted
materials.
L'Anza, the plaintiff in Quality King, made hair care products in the
United States for sale domestically and abroad. These products had
copyrighted labels. Its distributor in the United Kingdom sold products to a
distributor in Malta. These goods reentered the U.S. market without
L'Anza's permission, and were resold by unauthorized dealers in the
United States who had purchased the goods at discounted prices from
Quality King. 129 L'Anza contended that these resales violated its exclusive
123. Cf. Gordon Katz, supra note 20, at 219 -20.
124. 2016 WL 1464229, at *6 (citing Quality King and Kirsaeng).
125. Id. at *6.
126. Id. at *7 (citing and quoting Sam Francis Foundation, 784 F.3d at 1324 & n.1). Cf
Morseburg, 621 F.2d at 978.
127. 2016 WL 1464229, at *7. The royalty undermines first sale, a doctrine which rests on
the fundamental principle of free alienation of property, by keeping buyers from ever acquiring
unencumbered title to works of art. Register's Update, supra note 1, at 58.
128. Id., at*6 -*8.
129. Quality King, 523 U.S. at 138 -40.
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import/distribution rights under section 602(a)(1); but Quality King's first
sale defense was successful. 13  The question presented was "whether the
right granted by § 602(a) is also limited by §§ 107 through 120. More
narrowly, the question is whether the 'first sale' doctrine endorsed in §
109(a) is applicable to imported goods." 131  The Court answered both
questions affirmatively. Where the copyrighted work is lawfully made in
the United States for export, and is subject to a valid first sale, its
subsequent re-importation is permissible under section 109 and is not
prohibited by section 602(a)(1). That section provides that in some
circumstances importation violates the exclusive right to distribute copies
under 106(3), and section 106(3) is in turn limited by sections 107 to 122,
including first sale in section 109.132
The plaintiff in Kirtsaeng, the book publisher John Wiley & Sons, also
alleged that its import/distribution rights under 602(a)(1) were violated by
defendant Kirtsaeng's purchase in Asia for subsequent resale in the U.S. of
copyrighted textbooks that Wiley published in Asia and distributed in Asia.
Kirtsaeng's resales in the U.S. of textbooks that he had purchased on the
open market in Asia were at prices well below those set by Wiley for the
same textbooks that it made and published domestically. 133  The Court
considered "whether the 'first sale' doctrine applies to protect the buyer or
other lawful owner of a copy (of a copyrighted work) lawfully
manufactured abroad," and whether that buyer can "bring that copy into the
United States (and sell it or give it away) without obtaining permission to
do so from the copyright owner[.] 134 The Court answered this question
affirmatively as in L'Anza. Here again, the plaintiff wanted to block
importation of the copyrighted works and the defendant's first sale defense
was successful. 135
The Supreme Court stated in these decisions that the first sale doctrine
provides "once the copyright owner places a copyrighted item in the stream
of commerce by selling it, he has exhausted his exclusive statutory right to
control its distribution."' 136 This doctrine has created secondary markets by
"leaving buyers of goods free to compete with each other when reselling or
otherwise disposing of those goods." 137 It shifts market power away from
the copyright holder toward competition and is to the "advantage of the
130. Id. at 152. See also Craig Joyce et al., supra note 36, at 523 - 24.
131. Quality King, 523 U.S. at 138.
132. Craig Joyce et al., supra note 36, at 523 - 24.
133. Kirtsaeng 133 S. Ct. at 1356- 57.
134. Id. at 1355.
135. Id. at 1355 - 56.
136. Quality King, 523 U.S. at 152.
137. Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1363.
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consumer." 138 The Court characterized section 109(a) as having a broad
reach, and that it should not be read in a cramped manner. 139 First sale, as
codified in section 109(a), means that buyers of copyrighted works "are
free to dispose of [them] as they wish."1 40 Subsequent rulings have said
that this freedom includes the right to resell the goods for whatever price
the buyer deems appropriate, without regard to the wishes of the copyright
holder. 14 1  The law is at odds with these principles because it gives
California artists an advantage not enjoyed by other artists, and it
disadvantages California art dealers against those outside the state.
Copyright owners cannot use their rights to fix resale prices in downstream
markets. 142
Based on these recent statements about the first sale doctrine, it is no
longer appropriate to analogize the CRRA to the state record piracy law in
Goldstein as the Ninth Circuit panel did in Morseburg in 1980. The district
court in Estate of Graham said that this takes Goldstein out of the way 143
and enabled it to state that Morseburg's analysis of CRRA's impact on first
sale was flawed. It concluded the CRRA was at odds with the first sale
doctrine because it impermissibly restricted downstream transactions
between resellers and buyers of art and not just post-sale income. 144 In
essence, it is appropriate to extrapolate from the Supreme Court's
statements about first sale in Quality King and Kirtsaeng to conclude that
the CRRA regulates an area that is protected by the Copyright Act -a
purchaser's rights in the copies he or she has acquired-and thereby it
"encroaches on a subject matter Congress expressly addressed in §
109(a)." 145 The district court concluded its conflict preemption analysis by
stating that
it is a fundamental tenet of federalism that a conflict
between Congress and a state legislature is resolved in
favor of Congress. U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. Because the
CRRA disrupts Congress's efforts to balance the interests
of copyright holders and downstream consumers, it must
be preempted. 146
138. Id.
139. Quality King, 523 U.S. at 152.
140. Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1355.
141. Omega S.A., 776 F.3d at 695.
142. Id.
143. 2016 WL 1464229, at *6.
144. Id. at *7 (citing Sam Francis Foundation, 784 F.3d at 1324 & 1334).
145. Id. at *6.
146. Id. at *8.
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There is a counter argument to the district court's broad application of
the Supreme Court's first sale decisions: Quality King and Kirtsaeng are
not on point because both cases are really about parallel importation or the
so-called gray market. There are price differentials domestically and
abroad for certain goods which are sometimes great enough to permit
entrepreneurs to purchase goods overseas, import them, sell them here for
less than the current domestic price, and still make a profit. 147 It was in the
context of this trade issue that the Court had to construe sections 602(a)(1),
106(3) and 109(a)(1) in both Quality King and Kirtsaeng. The plaintiffs in
these cases-the copyright owners-wanted to charge different prices for
copies of their works in different geographic regions and they also wanted
to completely block the defendants from importing these goods into the
United States for resale. 148
In contrast, the plaintiffs in Estate of Graham are not attempting to use
the CRRA to completely block sales of their copyrighted works of fine art,
let alone block importation or to even fix prices in downstream markets.
The artists are fine with resales of their art work. The California statute
requires defendants to take certain steps when they sell an artist's work, but
those steps do not prevent the auction houses and dealers from reselling or
otherwise disposing of those copyrighted goods. 149 These several steps
may have undermined the CRRA for purposes of the Dormant Commerce
Clause analysis by the Ninth Circuit in the Sam Francis Foundation
ruling, 150 but it does not follow automatically that the CRRA does more
than regulate sale proceeds and post-sale income when it is applied solely
to California transactions. 151 These steps do not fix prices in downstream
markets for works of visual art. The CRRA might cause some auction
houses and collectors to leave California to avoid the burdens the statute
imposes on them to collect resale royalties, 152 but this is not an issue of
copyright infringement or copyright policy. In short, the Supreme Court's
statements about first sale in Quality King and Kirtsaeng are not directly on
point in regard to the alleged tensions between the CRRA and the first sale
doctrine.
147. Craig Joyce et al., supra note 36, at 522.
148. Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1374 (Ginsburg, R., dissenting).
149. Cf. Estate of Graham, 2016 WL 1464229, at *6.
150. 784 F.3d at 1324.
151. Cff 784 F.3d at 1334 (Berzon, M., concurring).
152. Cf Estate of Graham, 2016 WL 1464229, at *7.
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VI. Express Preemption Under Section 301(a) of the Copyright
Act
Section 301(a) of the Copyright Act worked a dramatic change in U.S.
copyright law by "creating a single system of federal protection for all
works of authorship, published or unpublished." 153 It provides that any
state law claim, whether based on common law or statute, is preempted if:
(1) it creates "legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified in
section 106;" and (2) such rights are claimed in "works of authorship that
are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject
matter of copyright." 154 The two criteria for preemption concern the nature
of the right being asserted and the nature of the work in which that right is
claimed; these criteria must coalesce. 155 On the other hand, section 301(b)
makes clear that the states may protect rights and interests that are not
equivalent to those protected by copyright as well as afford equivalent
protection to non-copyrightable subject matter. 156
Section 301 reflects a clear congressional intent to preempt and
abolish any rights under the common law or statutes of a state that are
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights that copyright owners enjoy and
that extend to works coming within the scope of copyright. 157  "The
declaration.., in section 301 is intended to be stated in the clearest and
most unequivocal language possible, so as to foreclose any conceivable
misinterpretation of its unqualified intention that Congress shall act
preemptively, and to avoid the development of any vague borderline areas
between State and Federal protection." 158 Unfortunately, section 301 has
not turned out to be a model of clear, comprehensible drafting, 159 and the
courts have been grappling with its application since the late 1970s.
There is consensus that determining the scope of preemption under
section 301 involves two inquiries: what constitutes copyrightable subject
153. David Shipley, Three Strikes and They're Out at the Old Ball Game: Preemption of
Performers' Rights of Publicity Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 20 ARIZ. STATE L. REv. 369,
374 (1988) [hereinafter "Three Strikes"].
154. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
155. Three Strikes, supra note 153, at 374 - 75.
156. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b).
157. H. REP. supra note 64, at 131.
158. Id.
159. Craig Joyce et al., supra note 36, at 965. This casebook has a summary of section 301's
tortured legislative history including the debates within the House Judiciary Committee over what
to do about misappropriation and other common law claims with copyright like characteristics.
Id. at 965 - 68.
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matter; and what rights are equivalent to those granted by copyright. 160 As
noted earlier, the subject matter of an artist's claim for royalties under the
CRRA is a work of visual art. Paintings, sculptural works, numbered prints
or photographs, and glass works all come within the subject matter of
copyright as pictorial, graphic and sculptural works under section
102(a)(5). 161  That cannot be disputed. 162  Accordingly, the critical
preemption issue for the CRRA is whether the artist's claim under the
California statute is equivalent to a copyright infringement claim. The term
"equivalent" is not defined, the legislative history does not help, and the
courts have relied on their own resources in determining whether a state
law protects equivalent rights. 
163
The artist's basic claim under the CRRA is that a defendant, such as
an auction house, sold her work of art without paying her the required
royalty. The defendant will deny liability by raising the first sale doctrine
under section 109(a); the plaintiff artist sold the work to us, and we are free
to resell that object without restraint. The auction house defendant will
contend that the artist's claim for a resale royalty is nothing more than a
garden-variety infringement claim based on a violation of the artist's
distribution right under section 106(3), that the CRRA enlarged the
distribution right, and that the artist's right to control further distribution of
the object ended when she sold it to the auction house in the first place.
The conduct that triggers the claim under the CRRA is the distribution of
the work. And thus, it is equivalent to a claim for violation of the
distribution right and is preempted. 164
The issue of equivalency has troubled courts since the current
Copyright Act went into effect on January 1, 1978. The prevailing
approach is the "extra element test." 165 The test reasons that if state law
causes of action contain elements that are different in kind from copyright
160. Paul Goldstein, Preempted State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory
Licenses: Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24 UCLA L. REv. 1107, 1112 (1977); Three Strikes,
supra note 153, at 375.
161. See supra notes 64 to 68 and accompanying text. See also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (the
definition of pictorial, graphic and sculptural works).
162. Estate of Graham, 2016 WL 14624229, at *9 (any claims under the CRRA fall within
the subject matter of copyright).
163. Craig Joyce et al., supra note 36, at 974 n.6.
164. Estate of Graham, 2016 WL 1464229, at *9 (citing and quoting from 2 Nimmer on
Copyright § 8C.04[A][1].
165. Craig Joyce et al., supra note 36, at 974 n.6. A claim is not equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights if it includes an 'extra element' instead of or in addition to acts of reproduction,
performance, distribution or display which alters the nature of the action so that it is qualitatively
different from an infringement claim. Computer Associates International v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d
693, 716 (2nd Cir. 1992).
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infringement, the cause of action is not preempted. 66 As for the issue of
equivalency, it can be resolved by determining whether the state law may
be abridged by an act which, in and of itself, would infringe one of the
exclusive rights; if the mere act of reproduction, adaptation, distribution,
performance or display triggers a violation of the state law doctrine, then it
is equivalent. On the other hand, if the plaintiff has to show an additional
element, such as palming off or the existence of a contract or trust
relationship and a breach of duty, then the state law claim is not equivalent,
and therefore escapes preemption.
67
The artist's position is that the CRRA creates an additional right, not
afforded by the Copyright Act, to 'downstream' royalties, and thus it is not
equivalent. It is unrelated to copyright and pertains instead to the sale of
tangible art objects, and copyright ownership is distinct from that material
art object as provided in section 202 of the Act. Therefore, this state-
created right does not supplant any rights in section 106.168 However, a
state law claim can be preempted even if it is not coextensive with
copyright. The House Report states that preemption occurs "even though
the scope of exclusive rights given under the [Copyright Act] is narrower
than the scope of [rights under state law]. 169
There are several arguments in support of equivalence. The Ninth
Circuit in the Sam Francis Foundation decision said that the CRRA
regulates transactions, not the income of resellers. 170 The CRRA grants the
artist an economic right that increases the economic incentive to produce
creative works by augmenting the copyright monopoly and simultaneously
inhibiting the purchaser's rights under the first sale doctrine. It impacts
downstream activities by enhancing the artist's distribution right and
inhibiting the purchaser's right to make further distributions. As Nimmer
points out, whether broader or narrower, if the same conduct triggers rights
or immunities under both federal and state law, then that conduct is
equivalent. 171 The challengers can also assert that the CRRA tries to
achieve what section 301 proscribes and thus should be preempted.
172
After all, the Register of Copyrights acknowledged that implementation of
resale royalty in the Copyright Act requires modification of first sale and
166. H.R. REP. at 132.
167. Computer Associates, 982 F.2d at 716-17; Del Madera Props. v. Rhodes & Gardner, 820
F.2d 973, 977 (9th Cir. 1987); Katz, Dochtermann & Epstein, Inc. v. Home Box Office, No. 97
CIV. 7763(TPG), 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1957, 1959 (S.D. I1 1999).
168. Gordon Katz, supra note 20, at 219 - 20.
169. H.R. REP. at 131; Estate of Graham, 2016 WL 1464229, at *9.
170. 784 F.3d at 1324 -26.
171. 2 Nimmer on Copyright § 8C.04[A][1].
172. Gordon Katz, supra note 20, at 220.
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would alter well-established principles of free alienability in our property
jurisprudence. 7 3  If enactment of resale royalty legislation, such as an
amendment to the Copyright Act, would require modification of first-sale
and our traditions of free alienability of property, then the California
statute's imposition of the resale royalty is equivalent to the distribution
right. Moreover, the sponsor of the CRRA acknowledged that it might be
preempted by the Copyright Act. 174
In addition, as discussed in connection with conflict preemption under
the Supremacy Clause, 175 recent Supreme Court decisions hold that the first
sale doctrine as codified in section 109(a), not only governs, but also
forbids, efforts to control downstream sales. 176  The Ninth Circuit has
stated that "[a]pplication of the first sale doctrine ... conclusively reaffirms
that copyright holders cannot use their rights to fix resale prices in the
downstream market." 177 The CRRA is a state law that controls downstream
sales and thereby creates a right that Congress declined to create. It should
be preempted under section 301(a) because it inhibits distribution of
copyrighted paintings and sculptural works and is thus equivalent to the
distribution right, one of the exclusive rights under section 106.178 Section
301's legislative history shows that Congress intended for the section to
preempt state laws which expand laws that Congress did not wish to see
expanded 179 and congressional silence on the issue of resale royalty
legislation should not be regarded as leaving this area open to state
legislation, as was the situation with sound recordings and the state record
piracy legislation at issue in Goldstein.1 80
VII. Other Preemption Issues and Arguments
A. Preemption Issues Were Acknowledged by the Register of Copyrights
Notwithstanding the Morseburg decision, it is important to note that
the Register's 1992 study of droit de suite recommended that "any resale
royalty law in the United States should be at the federal level" given the
potential problems of preemption. 181 Moreover, the Register stated that
173. Register's 1992 Report, supra note 7, at 148 & 134.
174. G.L. Francione, supra note 13, at 106 - 07 n.6.
175. See supra notes 127 to 145 and accompanying text.
176. See Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 776 F.3d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 2015).
177. Id.
178. Estate of Graham, 2016 WL 1464229, at *9 - *10; 2 Nimmer on Copyright §
8C.04[A][1].
179. H.REP.atl3l.
180. Gordon Katz, supra note 20, at 220.
181. Register's 1992 Report, supra note 7, at 86.
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"[i]mplementation of the royalty would require qualification of the first
sale doctrine."'1 82 It also said the question of preemption was not settled,
that cases and commentary since Morseburg suggested a different result
under the 1976 Copyright Act,1 83 and that this had chipped away at
Morseburg's foundation. 184  The Register's study discussed a California
decision citing Nimmer's opinion that resale royalty was preempted under
the 1976 Copyright Act185 as well as a federal district court decision
holding that a Pennsylvania statute regulating motion picture licensing was
preempted. 86  That court had acknowledged Morseburg but concluded,
after noting the changes made by the Copyright Act of 1976, that although
the Pennsylvania law did not establish a competing copyright system or an
equivalent right, it substantially restricted conditions under which a
copyright holder could distribute and license his or her own work and
thereby interfered with the copyright holder's control over the sale or the
commercial use of their work. 
187
Even though the Pennsylvania law regulating motion picture licensing
was upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 188 these
observations and statements by the Register of Copyrights undermine the
Ninth Circuit's statement in Morseburg that the CRRA and copyright law
function harmoniously. The tension between the CRRA and the first sale
doctrine is also acknowledged in the Register's 2013 study of resale
royalties which says that Congress could conclude that a variety of
considerations justify qualification of the first sale doctrine so as to provide
a resale royalty that benefits artists, and also acknowledges that there
would not be a constitutional bar to the passage of such a statute. 189 After
all, Congress has broad authority to establish the nation's intellectual
property policy,1 90 the courts are deferential to how the legislature exercises
this authority, 1 91 and this authority would certainly include1 92 placing limits
182. Register's 1992 Report, supra note 7, at 148. The Register also asked whether Congress
would want to qualify first sale and "abandon well-settled principles of free alienability in Anglo-
American property jurisprudence." Id. at 134.
183. Id. at 77. This report cites and quotes from Nimmer who said that the CRRA would be
preempted under section 301 of the Copyright Act of 1976. Id. at 79 - 80.
184. Id. at 83.
185. Id. at 83 - 84 (citing and discussing Robert H. Jacobs, Inc. v. Westoaks Realtors, Inc.,
159 Cal. App. 3d 637 (1984)).
186. Id. at 84 - 85 (citing and discussing Associated Film Distributed Corp. v. Thornburgh,
520 F. Supp. 971 (E.D. Pa. 1981)).
187. 520F. Supp. at992 -94.
188. 800 F.2d 369, 376 (3rd Cir. 1986).
189. Register's Update, supra note 1, at 59.
190. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003).
191. Id. at204.
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on the first sale doctrine as already done in regard to the rental, lease or
lending of phonorecords and computer programs. 93
In any event, the several statements by the Register of Copyrights that
the enactment of an amendment to our copyright statute to provide a resale
royalty for works of visual art would also require an amendment to the
first-sale doctrine are strong evidence that the CRRA cannot function
harmoniously with our well-established first-sale doctrine jurisprudence,
and that the CRRA should be preempted.
B. The CRRA Is Analogous to a Tax on the Proceeds of a Sale.
Another argument to counter the CRRA's alleged encroachment on
section 109(a), which was alluded to in Morseburg,194 is that the CRRA
does not regulate resale of art, but only the proceeds of the resales. No lien
attaches to the object, the buyer of the art object is not secondarily liable
for the royalty, and the law does not impermissibly restrict the owner's
right to sell the painting.1 95 In essence, it does not restrict the secondary
market for art in a meaningful way. It activates only after a resale is
completed, and is akin to a tax on the revenue derived from the art
purchaser' s profitable resale of the work of fine art.
Taxes, which a state or a municipality impose for particular
transactions or for the purchase and sale of particular commodities, are
charges that purchasers and sellers of goods routinely pay, collect and
distribute. 196 Such taxes are not seen as restraints on alienation. The
CRRA is similar to a tax. Accordingly, it does not impinge the first sale
doctrine because it does not effectively limit a seller's options. It is no
more a restraint on alienation than a local ordinance providing that a certain
percentage of the proceeds on the sale of real estate in the community be
set aside, held in trust and ultimately used for purchasing property for
conservation purposes. 97
192. "[I]t is Congress that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited
monopoly that should be granted to authors ... in order to give the public appropriate access to
their work product." Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984).
193. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A) (2008).
194. 621 F.2d at 977 - 78.
195. Id.
196. Register's Update, supra note 1, at 58.
197. See, e.g., Block Island Land Trust, TOWN OF NEW SHOREHAM, http://www.new-
shoreham.com/displayboards.cfm?id=14 (last visited Oct. 9, 2016). The Block Island Land Trust
was established by legislation passed by the Rhode Island General Assembly in the 1980s. The
trust, which acquires and preserves open space on Block Island for conservation, recreation and
aquifer protection, is funded by a 3% fee on the transfer of real property on Block Island. The
Land Trust is administered by five unpaid Trustees who are elected for staggered four-year terms.
In 2007 Block Island reached a milestone of 43% preserved open space.
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One problem with this analogy is that taxes are collected and used for
public purposes, not as additional compensation for the creator/original
owner of the real or personal property that is being resold. In addition, the
majority in the Sam Francis Foundation decision explicitly rejected
Morseburg's statement that the CRRA did not restrict the transfer of art
198
by holding that it "facially regulate[s] ... commercial transaction[s]
between resellers and buyers" and that it restricts "conduct among private
parties." 199 It regulates downstream sales of art in conflict with the first
sale doctrine. 00 Moreover, by imposing a royalty right on the artist and the
purchaser/reseller that cannot be waived, the CRRA arguably restricts what
section 109(a) meant to be unfettered. It is counter to well-settled principles
of free alienability in our property jurisprudence.20 1  The 5% royalty
prevents the reseller from obtaining the full value of the art object in the
secondary market, and serves as a disincentive for art investors to resell
their art.202 This also undercuts copyright's first sale doctrine.0 3
C. States Can Regulate the Distribution of the Tangible Work
Section 202 of the Copyright ACt2 4 codifies the important distinction
between ownership of copyright and ownership of the material object; the
purchaser of a work of art acquires the object but not, absent a written
transfer agreement, the copyright in that work. Thus, droit de suite pertains
to the sale of the art object, not to copyright. Accordingly, California's
CRRA does not supplement any of the rights specified in the Copyright
Act. z° 5  The problem with this argument is that droit de suite is an
economic right that benefits the artist and that supplements and extends an
artist's distribution right in section 106(3). "Civil-law jurists ... classify
the droit de suite as an economic right, conceptually no different from
copyrighting.2 0 6 It augments the copyright monopoly and is at odds with
the balance between creators, copyright owners and the general public that
207Congress has attempted to achieve in the Copyright Act.
198. 621 F.2d at 978.
199. 784 F.3d at 1323-24 & n.1.
200. Estate of Graham, 2016 WL 1464229, at *7.
201. Register's Update, supra note 1, at 59 (quoting Register's 1992 Report, supra note 7, at
134).
202. Id.
203. Id.; see also Nimmer on Copyright, § 8C.04[A]{ 1}; WILLIAM PATRY, PATRY ON
COPYRIGHT § 18.52 (2016).
204. See supra notes 50 to 53.
205. Gordon Katz, supra note 20, at 219 - 20.
206. G.L. Francione, supra note 13, at 109 - 10.
207. Gordon Katz, supra note 20, at 219 - 20.
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On the other hand, there are several decisions involving unsuccessful
preemption challenges to state laws regulating the distribution of motion
pictures, in which courts rejected the argument that a state's trade
regulation affecting a copyright owner's monetary return is invalidated by
the Copyright Act. 20 8 The state statutes at issue in these cases prohibited
the practice of blind bidding for motion pictures, and set up procedures for
the open and orderly licensing of movies in the respective states. 20 9 These
laws were challenged by the movie distributors-the copyright owners--on
multiple grounds including preemption under the Supremacy Clause and 17
U.S.C. § 301.210 In essence, the laws were a sufficient burden on the
copyright owners' rights to require preemption. 211 However, the courts
stated that there is no "authority for the argument that state trade regulation
which affects distribution procedures and, indirectly, monetary returns
from copyrighted property is invalidated implicitly or explicitly by the
terms of the Copyright Act. 212
One of the courts explained that the statute did not deprive copyright
owners of their rights to prohibit reproduction, performance, distribution or
display of their works. "Indeed, by providing procedures for the licensing
of a film, the Act recognizes sub silentio the right of the copyright owner to
exhibit the motion picture and to grant an exclusive or restrictive license to
others to exhibit it."'213 This court emphasized that the Supreme Court had
long recognized the distinction between the bundle of rights which make up
copyright and the property produced and marketed by virtue of the
copyright,21 4 saying that the Supreme Court had rejected the notion that a
copyrighted work is not subject to state regulation of the manner in which it
215is marketed. This court and the Supreme Court also rejected claims that
the exclusive right to distribute includes the right to distribute in the
216
manner most desirable to the copyright owner. In short, the authority of
208. Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 800 F.2d 369, 376 (3rd Cir. 1986);
Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 441 (S.D. Ohio 1980), aff'd 679 F.2d
656 (6th Cir. 1982).
209. Blind bidding describes the licensing of a movie to a theater owner without the owner
first viewing the movie. The practice has been controversial since the 1940s, was subject to
consent decrees, and caused Ohio and Pennsylvania to enact bills prohibiting the practice,
restricting other licensing practices, and setting up procedures for open and orderly licensing of
movies for exhibition in those states. Allied Artists, 496 F. Supp. at 412 - 13; see also
Associated Film Distribution Corp., 800 F.2d at 370 - 71.
210. Allied Artists, 496 F. Supp. at 441; Associated Film Distribution Corp., 800 F.2d at 376.
211. Associated Film Distribution Corp., 800 F.2d at 376.
212. Id. (citing and quoting from Allied Pictures, 679 F.2d at 662-63).
213. Allied Artists, 496 F. Supp. at 443.
214. Id. at 446 (citing Fox Film v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 130 (1932)).
215. Fox Film, 286 U.S. at 128.
216. Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941).
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the states to regulate market practices dealing with copyrighted subject
matter is well established.217
These statements about state authority to regulate market practices
involving copyrightable subject matter seem to support California's
authority to enact the CRRA. After all, the obligation imposed on
California art dealers in regard to resale royalties seems insignificant
compared to Ohio's and Pennsylvania's regulation of the distribution of
copyrighted motion pictures to movie theaters in those states. Those
statutes placed limitations on the copyright owners' distribution rights with
respect to their movies and they were held not to be preempted. The
CRRA does not limit the copyright owner's distribution right but it does
have an impact on the purchaser's right under the first sale doctrine.
On the other hand, it is important to recognize that the movie
distributors who challenged the anti-blind bidding statutes in Ohio and
Pennsylvania had not sold their copyrighted works to the theaters. Instead,
they were exercising their exclusive rights to control the distribution and
public performance of their copyrighted works through rental and lease
pursuant to sections 106(3) and 106(4) of the Copyright Act. The anti-
blind bidding preemption decisions do not address the first sale doctrine.
In short, the strong statements about state authority to regulate market
practices seem to argue against preemption but the decisions in which these
statements were made are not directly on point in regard to the preemption
issues surrounding the CRRA.
D. The Contract Analogy
Defenders of the CRRA argue that since the first sale doctrine does
not restrict a copyright holder's right to limit subsequent distribution of
copies of her works by contract,218 there should be no problem with state
legislation imposing comparable limitations. L'Anza, the plaintiff in the
Quality King case, relied on the terms of its contracts with domestic
distributors to limit their sales to authorized resale outlets. It
acknowledged that those distributors were the owners of the products
purchased from it, and that unauthorized resale of those goods would
constitute a breach of contract but not copyright infringement due to first
sale. 219 If the copyright owner can impose limits by contract, why cannot
the state legislate something as innocuous as a resale royalty?
217. Allied Artists, 496 F. Supp. at 447.
218. United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 1977) (explaining that if a vendee
breaches an agreement not to sell a copy, he may be liable for breach of contract but not copyright
infringement).
219. Quality King, 523 U.S. at 143.
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The response in Estate of Graham to this contention is that even
though it is routine for copyright holders to exercise downstream control in
exchange for a variety of contractual benefits to resellers,220 a state law like
CRRA, that modifies first sale, substantially upsets the bargaining positions
of the parties by giving the copyright holder unprecedented market power.
"Without § 109(a), a copyright holder would not need to bargain for
downstream control: they would simply sue for copyright infringement as
soon as their products entered secondary markets." By shifting market
power from the purchaser/reseller of the art object to the artist/copyright
holder, the California statute thereby conflicts with first sale.221 It is for
Congress, not a state legislature, to alter the bargain and create an
exception to first sale as it has with sound recordings and computer
222
software. The Copyright Office has acknowledged this by saying that
implementation of a resale royalty would require qualification of first
sale.223
E. Baby Moose Drawings and VARA's Legislative History
Baby Moose Drawings, Inc. v. Valentine is a peculiar 2011 decision in
which a federal judge remanded an artist's CRRA claim for royalties to the
Los Angeles County Superior Court on the ground that removal was
improper because the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.2 24
The defendant, who had resold an artist's works without paying the royalty,
argued that the claim was completely preempted under section 301(a) for
225purposes of removal jurisdiction. The trial court disagreed, holding that
the 5% royalty was qualitatively different from the rights granted to
copyright holders by section 106 of the Copyright Act 22 6 and cited a
California Court of Appeals decision which held that a state law claim for
royalties pursuant to a contract was not equivalent to any of the exclusive
227rights secured by copyright.  In ordering remand the court also stated that
the legislative history of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 ("VARA")
made it clear that Congress intended the CRRA to withstand preemption. 2 8
220. Estate of Graham, 2016 WL 1464229, at *4.
221. Id.
222. Register's Update, supra note 1, at 58 - 59 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A)).
223. Register's 1992 Report, supra note 7, at 148. See also supra notes 180 to 192 and
accompanying text.
224. Baby Moose, at * 1.
225. Id. at*3.
226. Id.
227. Ild. (citing Durgom v. Janowiak, 87 Cal. Rptr.2d 619 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1999)).
228. Ild. (citing Committee on the Judiciary Report on Amendments to the Copyright Act,
H.R. REP. 514 (1990)).
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The court in the Estate of Graham preemption ruling indicated that
Baby Moose could apply to both express and conflict preemption, and the
court declined to follow it.229 First, the court said Baby Moose was not
controlling because complete preemption was narrower than conflict or
express preemption. Second, the court disregarded the Baby Moose
court's conclusion that the right granted by the CRRA was an extra element
qualitatively different from those granted in section 10623 1 and explained
that the Baby Moose court had not considered the CRRA's relationship to
232the first sale doctrine. And third, the court criticized the Baby Moose
court's reliance on a statement in VARA's legislative history to the effect
that additions to the Copyright Act would "not preempt a cause of action
for misattribution of a reproduction of a work of visual art or for a
violation of a right to a resale royalty."233 The Estate of Graham court said
that VARA's legislative history could not control a question of preemption
under section 301(a) because VARA itself added section 301(f) to the
Copyright Act: a separate preemption section applicable to moral rights
claims under state law. It also said that a post-enactment interpretation of a
234statute is not a legitimate tool of statutory interpretation. Accordingly,
the court concluded that VARA's legislative history does not preclude
preemption of the CRRA under section 301(a), whether or not Morseburg
235is still good law in the Ninth Circuit.
The court in Estate of Graham was correct in finding Baby Moose
unpersuasive. It is best treated as a claim for royalties under state law that
was improperly removed to federal court on the basis of the federal defense
of preemption. The well-pleaded complaint rule provides that federal
question 'arising under' jurisdiction exists only when the federal question
appears on the face of the plaintiff's well pleaded complaint; the plaintiff is
the master of the complaint, and here the artist agent's claim alleged only a
state claim. 6  In addition, the Baby Moose court's extra-element
discussion of the CRRA, holding that a CRRA claim was qualitatively
different from rights granted by copyright, relied upon a state court
decision in a suit for royalties pursuant to a contract. That kind of claim is
229. Estate of Graham, 2016 WL 1464229, at *10.
230. Id. The Baby Moose court mentioned the well-established principle that removal to
federal court cannot be based on a federal defense, including the defense of preemption. 21011
WL 1258529, at *2 n.2 citing Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392.
231. Estate of Graham, 2016 WL 1464229, at *10 (citing Baby Moose, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 72583, at *3 & n. 4).
232. Id. (citing Baby Moose at *3).
233. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 20 (1990) (emphasis added by the court)).
234. Id. (quoting Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC., 562 U.S. 223, 242 (2011)).
235. Id. at*11.
236. Id. at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2011).
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not equivalent to a claim to resale royalties based on the CRRA.237
Moreover, the Baby Moose ruling made too much out of one sentence in
VARA's legislative history from 1990 regarding Congress's intent to have
the CRRA escape preemption under section 301 of the Copyright Act of
1976.238 VARA added a specific preemption provision in section 301(f)
and made no changes to section 301(a).
F. State Moral Rights Laws and Preemption
Article 6bis of the Berne Convention requires member nations to
protect a creator's moral rights of attribution and integrity. 9 It states:
Independently of the author's economic rights and even after the
transfer of said rights, the author shall have the right to claim
authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation,
or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to,
the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or
reputation. 240
Under this article, an artist retains some authority over his works of
visual art even after he sells them and even after the transfer of his
copyright. The right of integrity enables the artist to object to distortions,
mutilations or other modifications of her works, and the right of attribution
enables the artist to claim authorship and stop others from being named as
the creator.24 1 These are seen as inalienable and natural rights that exist
242independently of the artist's copyright. In a country where moral rights
are recognized, an artist would be able to object to the purchaser of one of
his works defacing or mutilating that painting or sculpture, even though he
could not object to the purchaser reselling the work.24 3
The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, which added section 106A to
the Copyright Act, recognized moral rights in the United States for the first
time. It was enacted to bring our laws into compliance with Article 6bis.244
It protects a select group of artists and narrowly defined works; in
237. Id. at *3 (citing Durgom v. Janowiak, 87 Cal Rptr. 2d 619 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1999)).
238. Id.at*3.
239. The Empty Promise, supra note 3, at 987. These are the two most commonly recognized
moral rights.
240. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis, adopted
by the U.S. Mar. 1, 1989, 102 Stat. 2853.
241. Craig Joyce et al., supra note 36, at 581.
242. The Empty Promise, supra note 3, at 987.
243. Craig Joyce et al., supra note 36 at 580 - 81. Moreover, if the artist transferred his
copyright to the purchaser, then the buyer would be free to reproduce and adapt the work of
visual art. Id.
244. Id.
2017
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
particular, works of visual art. 24 5 Prior to the passage of VARA, several
states, including California, enacted legislation that extended moral rights
246to visual artists and works of visual art. The California Art Preservation
Act prohibits the physical defacement, mutilation, or destruction of a work
of fine art, except by the artist who owns and possesses that work of fine
art. 47  Does this state law conflict with federal copyright policy? Is it
subject to conflict preemption or express preemption under section 301?248
In a way, this is a moot question because VARA amended section 301 to
add a section that preempts state law claims which are equivalent to moral
rights claims under section 106A.249 If the California Art Preservation Act
might have withstood a preemption challenge prior to the enactment of
VARA, then perhaps the CRRA, by analogy, should withstand that
challenge as well. If the limitations or restrictions on an art purchaser's
ownership of a work of art which are imposed by the California Art
Preservation Act would not be preempted, then the restriction on ownership
imposed by the CRRA should not be preempted either.
Some of the commentators who discussed this preemption issue
concluded that a moral rights claim under a statute such as the California
Art Preservation Act would not have been preempted under section 301(a)
because moral rights are qualitatively different from copyright in that they
do not protect an economic interest. 250 The counter argument asks whether
the activity giving rise to the moral rights claim is the same activity that
gives rise to a copyright violation even if intent or gross negligence has to
be shown to succeed on the state law claim. 25 1  For example, the
preemption argument would be that an artist's claim under the California
statute to prevent someone from altering his painting or sculpture would be
equivalent to a claim for violation of the right to prepare derivative works
based on the copyrighted work. If the owner of an art object also owned the
245. VARA protects "a painting, drawing, print or sculpture existing in a single copy, in a
limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author,
or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, carved or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that
are consecutively numbered by the author and bear the signature or other identifying mark of the
author." 17 U.S.C. § 101. Photographs are protected too if certain conditions are met but not
movies, books, magazines, advertising and promotional materials, and works for hire. Ild.; The
Empty Promise, supra note 3, at 990.
246. Craig Joyce et al., supra note 36, at 583 - 85.
247. Cal. Civ. Code § 987(c)(1).
248. See generally G.L. Francione, supra note 13, at 105.
249. 17 U.S.C. § 301(f).
250. Karen Gantz, Protecting Artists' Moral Rights: A Critique of the California Art
Preservation Act as a Model for Statutory Reform, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 873, 897 - 98 (1981);
Barbara Hoffman, The California Art Preservation Act, 5 Art & L. 53, 56 (1980); Gordon Katz,
supra note 20, at 217.
251. G. L. Francione, supra note 13, at 130 -31.
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copyright, he would defend the claim by raising his ownership of this
right.252 The artist's reply is that having to show that the defendant is
'intentionally defacing or mutilating' the work is qualitatively different
from showing an unauthorized alteration or modification in violation of the
right to prepare derivative works. That is an additional element that is not
253part of a copyright infringement action. In short, a strong argument was
made that a state law moral rights claim under the California Art
Preservation Act would have withstood a preemption challenge under
section 301.
On the other hand, there are variations on this hypothetical artist
versus art purchaser dispute, when the purchaser holds the copyright, which
give rise to serious conflict preemption issues: the artist's assertion of a
moral rights claim under the California statute runs directly into the
254purchaser's exercise of one or more of the exclusive rights. For
example, an art collector purchases a sculptor's unique statue and also
acquires copyright in that work, he then authorizes a company to make
derivative works, specifically reduced scale plastic reproductions of the
statue. These reproductions are offered for sale and the artist the claims
that this alteration of the statue is actionable under the art preservation
statute. The state law claim conflicts directly with the copyright owner's
rights and should be preempted under conflict preemption analysis.255
In summary, some state moral rights claims might have withstood an
express preemption challenge under section 301. However, a state moral
rights claim might have conflicted directly with the rights of the copyright
owner in situations when the artist transferred his or her copyright to the
purchaser of the work, and would have thus have been subject to conflict
preemption. Similarly, although claims under the CRRA might not be
equivalent to a copyright infringement claim for purposes of section 301,
such claims arguably conflict directly with the art purchaser's exercise of
rights under the first sale doctrine.
G. Patent Exhaustion
The first sale doctrine is well established in our patent law
jurisprudence and it is similar to copyright law's first sale doctrine. In
1853, the Supreme Court stated that "when the machine passes to the hands
of the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the [patent]
252. Id. at 131.
253. Cf id. at 138 (concluding that the California Art Preservation Act would survive an
express preemption challenge under section 301(a)).
254. See id. at 140 -42.
255. Id. at 141 - 42.
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monopoly., 256 Also known as "exhaustion," the patent law version of first
sale makes clear that "once lawfully made and sold, there is no restriction
on [its] use to be implied for the [patentee's] benefit., 257  The
inventor's/patentee's sale of the patented article exhausts the monopoly in
that article so that the inventor/patentee may no longer, by virtue of the
patent, control the use or disposition of the article. In a nutshell, "the
initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that
item.' '259 This doctrine has been applied broadly by the Supreme Court.
"The theory is that the patentee, by selling the patented article, has
surrendered his right to control the use and sale of the particular article.
The buyer may use the article and may sell it to another buyer, who
likewise may use and sell the article without infringement.' '260 First sale
does not, however, allow the buyer to make or use additional embodiments
of the invention; the widget can be resold but the buyer cannot make more
widgets.2 61
Would a state statute modifying the patent law exhaustion doctrine in
roughly the same way the CRRA applies to the resale of fine art be subject
to preemption? For instance, imagine Michigan enacting legislation aimed
at helping the automobile industry, specifying that a patentee was to
receive a 5% royalty each time certain patented articles were resold. This
statute would probably not withstand a challenge because of the Supreme
Court's 1989 decision in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.26 2
The Court held unanimously that a Florida statute prohibiting the use of a
direct molding process to duplicate unpatented boat hulls conflicted with
the "strong federal policy favoring free competition in ideas which do not
merit patent protection" and was therefore preempted by the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution.26 3  The opinion repeated the principle
announced in Goldstein that the states have power to adopt rules that
264promote intellectual creation within their own domains, and that this
power extended to the subject matter of patents so long as the rule did not
265impermissibly interfere with the federal scheme. However, the Florida
256. Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1853).
257. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453,457 (1873).
258. U.S. v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942).
259. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elec's, Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008).
260. STEPHEN MCJOHN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS 347 (5th
Ed. 2015).
261. Id.
262. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
263. Id. at 168 (quoting Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 656 (1969)).
264. "The patent and copyright clauses do not, by their own force or by negative implication,
deprive the states of' their power to adopt such rules. Id. at 165
265. Id.
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statute went beyond the scope of protection traditionally available under
unfair competition doctrine and trade secret law, and restricted the public's
ability to exploit unpatented designs in general circulation, therefore
upsetting the competitive balance in patent law.266
Although this hypothetical state statute providing a patented device
resale royalty does not restrict the public's ability to exploit an article
unprotected by a patent or copyright like the statute in Bonito Boats or the
unfair competition laws at issue in Sears and Compco, it does fly in the
face of patent law's first sale doctrine which stands for the principle that
"[t]he authorized sale of an article that substantially embodies a patent
exhausts a patent holder's rights and prevents the patent holder from
invoking patent law to control postsale use of the article., 267  The
hypothetical state law-by imposing the royalty-would have an impact on
the postsale use of the patented articles. It gives the patentee a proprietary
right that he otherwise would not enjoy and should be preempted under the
Supremacy Clause.268
The likelihood that this hypothetical state patent royalty statute would
be preempted because it conflicts with patent law's first sale doctrine
provides another argument for the preemption of the CRRA because the
CRRA conflicts with copyright's first sale doctrine. This is due in part to
the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court turned to patent law for guidance
several times when ruling on major copyright law issues. For instance, in
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. the Court turned to
the Patent Act's "staple article or commodity of commerce" principle in
section 271, and its Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Hass Co. decision,
discussing vicarious liability and contributory infringement in copyright
law. 269 The Court said:
266. Id. at 167; see generally Rock the Boat, supra note 84.
267. Quanta Computer, 533 U.S. 617, 638 (2008).
268. This result would be consistent with the Supreme Court's historic intellectual property
jurisprudence that emphasizes the public purposes embodied in the Copyright and Patent Clause
instead of focusing on the proprietary interests of copyright owners and patentees. Cf David
Shipley, Congressional Authority Over Intellectual Property Policy After Eldred v. Ashcroft:
Deference, Empty Limitations, and Risks to the Public Domain, 70 ALBANY L. REv. 1255, 1257
(2007).
269. 464 U.S. 417, 440-41 (1984). In this portion of its Sony opinion the Supreme Court
cited and quoted from 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) which provides that the sale of a "staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use" is not contributory
infringement. It also discussed in Rohm & Hass decision, 448 U.S. 176 (1990), and other cases
which deny the patentee any right to control the distribution of unpatented articles unless they are
unsuited for any commercial noninfringing use. Id. at 198. The Court explained in Rohm & Hass
that unless a commodity "has no use except through practice of a patented method," the patentee
has no right to claim that its distribution constitutes contributory infringement. Id. at 199.
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We recognize there are substantial differences between the patent
and copyright laws. But in both areas the contributory
infringement doctrine is grounded on the recognition that
adequate protection of a monopoly may require the courts to look
beyond actual duplication of a device or publication to the
products or activities that make such duplication possible. The
staple item of commerce doctrine must strike a balance between a
copyright holder's legitimate demand for effective - not merely
symbolic-protection of the statutory monopoly, and the rights of
others freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas of
270
commerce.
Similarly, in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., the
Court turned to patent law to say that Sony's staple-article of commerce
rule would not preclude liability where evidence showed statements and
actions directed at promoting infringement:
271
For the same reasons that Sony took the staple-article doctrine of
patent law as a mode for its copyright safe-harbor rule, the
inducement rule, too, is a sensible one for copyright. We adopt it
here, holding that one who distributes a device with the object of
promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear
expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement,
272is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.
The copyright law and patent law first sale doctrines are similar.
Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the vitality and scope of
273both doctrines in recent decisions. If a state law regulating postsale
transactions involving patented articles would be preempted, there is a
good argument that the CRRA should be preempted as well since it also
regulates postsale transactions involving copyrighted works of fine art.
H. Critical Commentary
Several treatise writers have weighed in on the side of preemption of
the CRRA. One scholar said that the conclusion in Morseburg that the
270. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
271. 545 U.S. 913, 935 (2005).
272. ld. at 936- 37.
273. See, e.g., Quality King Distribs. Inc. v. L'Anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135
(1998); Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elec's, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008); Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley
& Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013). See also, Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc., 816
F.3d 721 (Fed. Cir. 2016), petition for cert. filed, 84 USLW 3563 (Mar. 21, 2016) (the petition is
asking the U.S. Supreme Court to consider the impact of the Kirtsaeng and Quanta Computer
decisions on issues of patent exhaustion).
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royalty did not conflict with first sale was dubious.27 4  Another author
noted that since first sale is considered to exhaust the copyright owner's
distribution right with respect to the art object that was sold, the resale
royalty therefore grants a distribution-type right to the artist.275 Nimmer's
treatise says that the federal policy contained in the first sale doctrine
permits uninhibited resale of art following the initial sale, and that this
policy cannot be countered by a contrary state law, even when the state
276law's restraint is simply a royalty instead of a prohibition. Finally,
another commentator wrote that droit de suite should be preempted because
it attempts to supplement the rights granted by copyright.2 77
The district court opinion in the Estate of Graham decision stated, in
support of its preemption ruling that the leading treatises agree that the
royalty obligation "acts as a disincentive for art investors to resell their art,
thereby restricting the secondary markets for fine art in California. That
result undercuts the purpose of the first sale doctrine and inhibits the
uniformity Congress sought to achieve by enacting the Copyright Act. 278
The court also stated that it was "of the same view as these prominent
treatises.,
279
VIII. Conclusion
"As some seventy countries have recognized, adoption of a statutory
resale royalty right is one way to level the playing field [for artists], and the
[Copyright] office accordingly supports Congress's consideration of such
legislation. ,280 It is readily acknowledged that amending the Copyright Act
to provide for a resale royalty would require modification to the first sale
doctrine.2 1 There is no constitutional bar to such action because, as a
general matter, Congress has broad authority to determine the nation's
intellectual property policy in ways that, in the judgment of the legislative
branch, will serve the ends of the Copyright Clause.282 The courts defer
274. HOWARD B. ABRAMS, 1 THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 5:188 (2015).
275. WILLIAM PATRY, ET AL., LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 89 n. 47 (6th ed. 1986).
276. 2 Nimmer on Copyright § 8-381.
277. Gordon Katz, supra note 20, at 220 (1978). Even the legislator who sponsored the
CRRA said it might be preempted under the Copyright Act. G.L. Francione, supra note 13, at
106 - 07 n.6.
278. 2016 WL 1464229, at *5 (citing and discussing Nimmer on Copyright and Patry on
Copyright).
279. Id. at *6.
280. Register's Update, supra note 1, at 65.
281. See supra notes 183 to 195 and accompanying text.
282. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003); Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
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substantially to the will of Congress,2 83 and this would certainly extend to
placing new limitations on the first sale doctrine comparable to those
previously imposed.
The Register of Copyright's endorsement droit de suite, while
acknowledging that Congress would have to alter the first sale doctrine in
order to provide for a resale royalty, provides a strong argument that
California's resale royalty legislation is at odds with the Copyright Act and
should be preempted. In addition, notwithstanding the Ninth Circuit's
1980 decision in Morseburg v. Balyon, which upheld the CRRA against a
preemption challenge, this statute is subject to conflict preemption because
it is at odds with Copyright's well-established first sale doctrine. The
Ninth Circuit should no longer feel bound by Morseburg due in large part
to the U.S. Supreme Court's Quality King and Kirtsaeng decisions on first
sale which were issued in 1998 and 2013 respectively. Moreover, whether
or not Morseburg is still good law in the Ninth Circuit, the CRRA is
subject to express preemption under section 301(a) of the Copyright Act
because it grants a right in copyrightable subject matter that is equivalent to
the distribution right--one of the exclusive rights granted in section 106-
and it simultaneously limits the first stale doctrine codified in section
109(a). Either way, the Ninth Circuit should conclude that the CRRA is
preempted.
283. See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 889 (2012).
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